Hofstra Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 2

Article 4

1980

Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors
Gail Miers

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Recommended Citation
Miers, Gail (1980) "Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol8/iss2/4

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Miers: Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors

COMMENT
MOHONK TRUST v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS
ENVIRONMENTAL

LAw-Property Tax Exemptions-Real property

used for environmental and conservation purposes is exempt from
taxation in New York State. 47 N.Y.2d 476, 393 N.E.2d 876, 418
N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
There is a growing awareness in society that continuing efforts
are necessary to preserve some land in its natural state for the public's use and enjoyment by protecting it from the encroachment of
industrial and residential development. In New York, both the
state constitution1 and the Environmental Conservation Law2 reflect a desire to further the conservation of forest and wildlife. The
use of private land for conservation purposes protects natural resources the state does not have the funds to maintain. The costs to
private parties become prohibitive, however, if the land is subject
to local property taxes. 3 At the same time, local governmental fi1.

N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 3(1). This section provides in part:
Forest and wildlife conservation are hereby declared to be policies of
the state. For the purpose of carrying out such policies the legislature may
appropriate moneys for the acquisition by the state of land, outside of the
Adirondack and Catskill parks as now fixed by law, for the practice of forest
or wild life conservation.
2. N.Y. ENvim. CONSERV. LAW § 1-0101 (McKinney 1973). Section 1 of this provision provides:
The quality of our environment is fundamental to our concern for the
quality of life. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of New
York to conserve, improve and protect its natural resources and environment
and control water, land and air pollution, in order to enhance the health,
safety and welfare of the people of the state and their overall social and economic well being.
Id. § 1-0101(1). In addition, a recent amendment provides that "the policies, statutes,
regulations, and ordinances of the state ... should be interpreted and administered
in accordance with [these] policies." Id. § 8-0103(6) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
3. When large areas of privately owned wilderness lands are taxed at market
value, the land is often sold for development. Providing tax exemptions for conservation land forestalls development and serves to further state environmental policy. See
generally Currier, Exploring the Role of Taxation in the Land Use Planning Process,
51 IND. L.J. 27 (1975); Henry, PreferentialProperty Tax Treatment of Farmlandand
Open Space Under Michigan Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 428 (1975).
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nances are based almost exclusively on property taxes. The proliferation of tax exemptions has removed more than thirty percent of
4
the assessed value of real property in the state from the tax rolls.
The removal of real property from the tax rolls not only serves to
erode the municipal tax base but also shifts the tax burden to pri-

vately owned nonexempt property. 5
This conflict between these two well-established societal goals
was recently brought into focus by the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 6 where the issue
was whether conservation land qualified for exemption from real
property taxation. Although the result of this case was to exempt
the Trust land, it is unclear if the exemption for conservation land

is constitutionally insulated or subject to legislative abrogation because the court did not address the constitutional implications of its
holding. By failing to resolve the nature of the exemption the court
lost an opportunity to clarify the legislature's power to redefine

certain tax-exempt categories. Instead the court's opinion is internally inconsistent and, therefore, of little guidance to future legislative or judicial decisionmakers. Maximum flexibility is needed to
meet society's changing needs, and this would have been assured if
the court had retained the power to construe these provisions in
the judiciary.
4. See JoiNT LEGIS. COMM. TO STUDY AND INVESTIGATE REAL PROP. TAx ExEMPTIONS, FINAL REPORT, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 15J. In its report, the committee observed that the current exemption problem has attained acute proportions. It was estimated that in 1967 more
than 30% of the assessed value of all real property in the State was exempt from taxation for various reasons. Id. at 25. Nonprofit organizations accounted for roughly
17.6% of all exempt real property listed on assessment rolls in 1967. Id. at 33. Of
this, 10% has constitutional protection as religious, educational, or charitable. This
report suggested "that a failure to reorder exemption priorities will only result in a
continued and increasingly severe erosion of the tax bases of municipal corporations." Id. at 35. But see Ginsberg, Realty Tax Exemptions-Policy or Politics?,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1976 at 1, col. 1. Statistics on the proliferation of tax-exempt property are misleading because 80% of tax-exempt property in New York State is owned
by public entities. This includes federal, state, local, and public authorities. There
would be no advantage in permitting local governments to tax property that they
owned, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents taxation of federal property.
See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
5. See N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 15, supra note 4, at 34. The committee recommended amending the real property tax law "to make the exemption of nonprofit organizations other than religious, charitable, educational, cemetery and hospital organizations optional with municipal corporations." Id. at 40.
6. 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979). For a discussion of
Mohonk, see Robinson, Environmental Law-Two Landmark Cases, N.Y.L.J., July
26, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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TAx EXEMPTIONS FOR REAL PROPERTY
New York law currently grants exemptions from real property
taxation pursuant to three specific provisions. First, the New York
State Constitution provides a mandatory exemption for land used
exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. 7 Second, section 421(1)(a) of the Real Property Tax Law8 affords a mandatory exemption for the three purposes exempted by the constitution and for cemetery, hospital, and mental and moral
improvement purposes. Third, section 421(1)(b) 9 provides for discretionary exemptions, wherein certain uses are exempt as long as
the local government does not exercise its option to tax the land in
this category.
To assess the purposes of these provisions it is necessary to examine their historical development. The predecessor to section
N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1. This section provides in part:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal
property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as
defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized or
conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not operating
for profit.
8. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421(1)(a) (McKinney 1972). This section provides:
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational, moral or
mental improvement of men, women or children or cemetery purposes, or
for two or more such purposes and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes either by the owning corporation or association as hereinafter provided shall be exempt from taxation as provided
in this section.
Although this section is referred to as § 421 throughout this Comment, it legally
remains § 420. It was renumbered § 421 in 1971, 1971 N.Y. Laws, ch. 417, § 5. However, the effective date of this amendment has been postponed annually by the legislature. E.g., 1979 N.Y. Laws, ch. 44, § 2. Commentators and courts refer to the provision as § 421.
9. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421(1)(b) (McKinney 1972). This section provides:
Real property owned by a corporation or association ... which is organized or conducted exclusively for bible, tract, benevolent, missionary, infirmary, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society,
library, patriotic or historical purposes, for the enforcement of laws relating
to children or animals, or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes either by the
owning corporation or association, or by another such corporation or association as hereinafter provided, shall be exempt from taxation; provided, however, that such property shall be taxable by any municipal corporation
within which it was located if the governing board or such municipal corporation, after public hearing, adopts a local law, ordinance or resolution so
providing.
7.
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421(1)(a) of the Real Property Tax Law was enacted in 1893.10 This
provision provided exemptions for organizations whose lands were
used exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of mankind, or for religious, charitable, missionary, hospital, educational,
patriotic, historical, or cemetery purposes." In 1938 a portion of
this section was incorporated in article 16, section 1 of the New
York State Constitution. 12 Land used "exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law" became exempt

under the constitution as well as under the statute. 13 Thus land
used for these purposes became constitutionally insulated from

taxation. In interpreting this provision, "exclusively" has been construed to mean primarily or principally.' 4 Thus, if land is used
for some nonexempt purposes that are merely incidental to the

primary purpose, the exemption is not defeated. 15 The use of
land primarily for any or all of these three stated purposes is

exempt from taxation, and such exemption cannot be altered or repealed.16
From 1938 to 1971, New York's real property tax exemptions
were contained' only in section 421(1) of the Real Property Tax Law
and in article 16 of the constitution. In 1971 the legislature altered
10. 1893 N.Y. Laws, ch. 498 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW §
421(1)(a) (McKinney 1972)).
11. Id. § 1 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 421(1)(a)
(McKinney 1972)).
12. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1. For the text of this provision, see note 7 supra.
13. The constitution provides exemptions for the three stated purposes "as defined by law." N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1. Thus far the legislature has not attempted to
define these terms. The Mohonk decision exhibits the confusion surrounding the
question of who is to give definition to these categories. See text accompanying notes
79-99 infra.
14. Mohonk Trust v, Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 483, 392 N.E.2d 876,
879, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (1979) (quoting Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 34
N.Y.2d 143, 153, 313 N.E.2d 30, 35, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561-62 (1974)).
15. See Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 313 N.E.2d 30,
35, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561 (1974).
16. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1. For the text of this provision, see note 7 supra.
This provision was explained in Riverdale Country School, Inc. v. City of New York,
13 A.D.2d 103, 213 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1st Dep't 1961), where the court stated that the object of article 16 was to preserve the "right to exemption against possible adverse
legislation." Id. at 105, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 546. Riverdale concerned an action by a
school to recover real estate taxes for the years 1925 through 1957. The plaintiff
sought to avoid the statute of limitations by relying on the constitutional provision
forbidding changes in the tax exemption of educational institutions. The court stated
that "the constitutional provision [N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1] . . . is of no assistance to

plaintiff as its object is to preserve the right to exemption against possible adverse
legislation and has no relationship to the situation here presented." Id.
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the statutory scheme and created a discretionary exemption category. 17 This occurred in response to a growing concern for the rapidly eroding local tax base 18 and the concomitant proliferation of
real property tax exemptions. 19 Some exemptions that had previously been mandatory under 421(1) were incorporated into
421(1)(b) 20 and could now be taxed at the discretion of local governments. This discretionary category included land used for bible,
tract, benevolent, missionary, infirmary, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, or
historical purposes. Significantly, the amended statute also granted
local governments the option to tax land used for "moral and mental improvement" purposes. 2 l Subsequently, property owned by
the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, YMCA, YWCA, and similar organizations was placed into this category and thus made taxable by local
governments. 22 This result triggered public opposition, 23 and in
1972 the legislature amended section 421 and removed the "mental
of secand moral improvement" use from the optional provisions
24
421(1)(a).
of
provisions
mandatory
the
to
tion 421(1)(b)
Many of the categories removed to section 421(1)(b) had been
characterized by the courts as distinct from the constitutionally
protected religious, charitable, and educational use categories, and
there was thus no constitutional bar to their removal. 2 5 For exam-

17.

1971 N.Y. Laws, ch. 414, § 2 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW

§ 421(1)(b) (McKinney 1972)).
18. Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1.
19. See N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 15, supra note 4, at 24-25.
20. 1971 N.Y. Laws, ch. 414, § 2 (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§ 421(1)(b) (McKinney 1972)) (§ 421(1) renumbered § 421(1)(a)).
21.

Id. (current version at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW

§

421(1)(b) (McKinney

1972)).
22. See Young Womens Christian Ass'n v. Wagner, 96 Misc. 2d 361, 365, 409
N.Y.S.2d 167, 170 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Opinion No. 17 (1975), 5 Opinions of Counsel,
New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment; Opinion No. 10 (1971), 1
Opinions of Counsel, New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment.
23. See Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1.
24. 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 529.
25. The constitutionality of § 421(1)(b) was upheld in Association of the Bar v.
Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974) (association of professionals held not to be organized primarily for charitable or educational purposes
since designed to advance interests of its members, thus legislature free to change
tax-exempt status of association). See American Bible Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 48 A.D.2d
308, 369 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1st Dep't 1975) (society not affiliated with any denomination
whose primary purpose was distribution of bibles not eligible for tax exemption
available to associations organized exclusively for religious purposes). The court explains that the "classifications contained in [§ 421(I)(b)] are not new and their dis-
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ple, case law has distinguished religious corporations from missionary societies, 26 libraries from educational institutions, 2 7 and historical from educational purposes. 28 American Bible Society v.
Lewisohn 29 held that the printing, publication, and circulation of
bibles and religious writings does not qualify as religious use under section 421(1)(a).30 Similarly, in Association of the Bar v.
Lewisohn3 l a distinction was drawn between organizations conducted primarily for scientific purposes and those conducted for
educational or charitable purposes. It was held that the former are
32
not entitled to a mandatory exemption.
While there was no constitutional bar to removal of the abovementioned purposes, there may be a constitutional bar to removal
of conservation lands held by nonprofit organizations and dedicated
to the general public use. There are decisions that indicate this
use is charitable in nature. 3 3 Although the word "charitable" is not
defined in the constitution or in general statutory terms, case law
34
sets important precedent and helps define charitable use.
As a threshold criterion a charitable organization must be nonprofit3 5 and must operate for the public benefit.3 6 The more difficult issue is determining what is charitable in nature. Case law has
tinct characteristics have been recognized in prior tax legislation . . .as well as by
the cases ...... Id. at 314, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 732 (citations omitted). Public playgrounds are exempt only at local option pursuant to 421(1)(b). However, it could be
argued that this is charitable use of the land and warrants a mandatory exemption.
This has not been tested in the courts.
26. See In re Watson, 171 N.Y. 256, 63 N.E. 1109 (1902).
27. See In re Frances, 189 N.Y. 554, 82 N.E. 1126 (1907).
28. See In re De Peyster, 210 N.Y. 216, 104 N.E. 714 (1914).
29. 48 A.D.2d 308, 369 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1st Dep't 1975).
30. Id. at 314, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
31. 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974).
32. Id. at 154, 313 N.E.2d at 36, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
33. See People ex rel. Untermyer v. McGregor, 295 N.Y. 237, 66 N.E.2d 292
(1946); In re Estate of De Forest, 147 Misc. 82, 263 N.Y.S. 135 (Sur. Ct. 1933); text
accompanying notes 41-46 infra.
34. See American Bible Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 48 A.D.2d 308, 369 N.Y.S.2d 725
(1st Dep't 1975). After stating that "the legislature was required to continue exemptions for 'religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law,'" the court
then discussed the role that prior case law has played in defining these terms. Id. at
314, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
35. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw § 421(1)(d) (McKinney 1972).
36. See In re Will of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 4542 112 N.E. 177 (1916). "If the purpose to be attained is personal, private or selfish, it is not a charitable trust. When
the purpose accomplished is that of public usefulness unstained by personal, private
or selfish considerations, its charitable character insures its validity." Id. at 460, 112
N.E. at 178.
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developed a flexible definition of charitable. In In re Estate of
Rockefeller 37 the court stated that " 'a charitable use . . . may be
applied to almost any thing that tends to promote the well-doing
and well-being of social man.' "38 Similarly, legal scholars have suggested that it would be unwise to bind the courts with a rigid formula. 39 The courts "should have latitude to include new'purposes
as society develops and public opinion changes and to exclude objectives which have become obsolete or unsuited to prevailing con40
ditions."
There is case law that indicates that the use of land for conservation purposes is considered a charitable use. In People ex rel.
Untermyer v. McGregor4l the preservation of parklike grounds devoted to the exhibition of flowering plants was held to be charitable
in nature. In Untermyer the testator bequeathed his estate to the
public to be used as a park. When the state renounced the gift, the
executors of the estate formed a nonprofit organization to actualize
the testator's intent and then sought an exemption for the land. 42
The New York Court of Appeals held that the public use and enjoyment of parklike grounds "for physical activity and relaxation
[and for] aesthetic pleasure and inspiration" 43 was charitable in nature and thus exempt under the statute. 44 In In re Estate of De
Forest45 a trust had been created to preserve certain forests, lakes,
and mountains in the Adirondacks. Since the trustees derived a
private profit, exemption was denied. However, in dicta the court
stated that where a trust is created "for the general purpose of
preserving forests or the scenic beauty of lands . . . and the prop37.
38.

177 A.D. 786, 165 N.Y.S. 154 (1st Dep't 1917).
Id. at 791, 165 N.Y.S. at 157-58 (citations omitted) (nursing home held to be

charitable use). This case predates article 16 of the New York constitution, which insulated charitable use from legislative abrogation. One may question whether in
light of § 421(1)(b) and the recent concern over the erosion of the tax base this broad
definition would be used today. However, the Rockefeller definition was recently
employed in Church Home of the Protestant Episcopal Church v. Wagner, 58 A.D.2d
972, 397 N.Y.S.2d 478 (4th Dep't 1977), where a nonprofit nursing home was granted
a property tax exemption.
39. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369 (rev. 2d ed. 1977); Neuschwander & Moore, Taxation: The CharitableProperty Tax Exemption, 13 WASHBURN
L.J. 161 (1974).
40. G. BOGERT, supra note 39, § 369, at 65.
41. 295 N.Y. 237, 66 N.E.2d 292 (1946).
42. Id. at 241-42, 66 N.E.2d at 294.
43. Id. at 243, 66 N.E.2d at 295.
44. Id. at 244, 66 N.E.2d at 295.
45. 147 Misc. 82, 263 N.Y.S. 135 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
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erty is dedicated to the general public use, it is undoubtedly valid
46
as a charitable trust."
In contrast, other cases have found that where land is used as
a wildlife sanctuary, this exemption stems from a "moral and mental improvement" use. 47 Thus, the definitional distinction between
"charitable" and "mental and moral improvement" is cloudy. However, the legal distinction is significant since only land used for a
charitable purpose is constitutionally protected.
THE MOHONK CASE

ProceduralSetting
The Mohonk Trust was created in 1963 by an agreement
between the donor, Mabel Smiley, and the six named trustees.
The Trust lands consist of five thousand acres of undeveloped
wilderness land, 1801 acres of which are located in the town of
Gardiner. Most of this land was sold to the Trust by members of
the Smiley family at considerably less than market value. The Trust
is managed by a board of trustees, composed in part by members
of the Smiley family, which meets several times a year. The Trust
is supported by outside contributions and fees charged to the public for use of the lands. This income is used to maintain the Trust
land and to carry on related activity. The Trust employs an administrator, several rangers, a part-time research assistant, and a part48
time maintenance worker.
The primary purposes of the Trust are: " 'to devote and apply
the [Trust] property . . . and the income to be derived therefrom
exclusively for charitable, religious, scientific, literary, or educational purposes . . . provided, however, that no part of this Trust
fund shall inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or indi46. Id. at 85, 263 N.Y.S. at 139.
47. See Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Scopelliti, 66 Misc. 2d 611, 321 N.Y.S.2d
1004 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (property acquired for maintenance of wildlife and to provide
opportunity to study flora and fauna held statutorily exempt as used for "educational," "scientific," and "mental and moral improvement" purposes) (although corporate charter stated it was organized for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes, held not to constitute charitable use); North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary,
Inc. v. City of Rye, 52 Misc. 2d 96, 274 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 28 A.D.2d 891, 282 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1967) (where land was used as
sanctuary for feeding, breeding, and nesting of wild birds and the public instructed
about conservation, land held statutorily exempt as devoted to "the moral and mental
improvement of man").
48. Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 479-80, 392 N.E.2d
876, 877, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763, 764 (1979).
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vidual.' "49 Some of the stated secondary purposes are contributing
to the public welfare, advancing the scientific and cultural arts,
reviving fundamental values so as to emphasize a humanitarian
concern for life, and protecting the integration of spiritual values
with physical needs and mental activities. 50
The Trust land is maintained in its natural state of undeveloped wilderness. As described by the court, "[t]he land is
heavily wooded with hardwood and evergreens and contains a variety of geological formations. It includes some of the most beautiful
land in New York State." 5 1 There is a system of trails through the
wilderness area for which informational services are provided. The
public uses the land for rock climbing, backpacking, camping, and
birdwatching. Many schools and universities regularly schedule
field trips to Mohonk as a supplement to their curricula. Scientific
studies have been conducted on the Trust land.52
The Trust lands located in Gardiner were taxed at a nominal
rate until 1974, when for the first time the town began to tax the
property at its full market value. 5 3 The Trust initiated two proceed54
ings challenging assessments for the years 1974 through 1976.
Since there was clearly no religious, cemetery, or hospital use, the
exemption for the Trust land would have to derive from its "chari49. Id. at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 877, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 764 (quoting trust agreement).
50. Id. (quoting trust agreement).
51. Id. at 480, 392 N.E.2d at 877, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
52. Id. at 481, 392 N.E.2d at 878, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 765. Members of the public
pay a nominal fee for use of the facilities, and the Trust has an agreement with Lake
Mohonk, an adjacent resort and hotel owned by the Smiley family, that allows the
hotel to pay an annual fee so that the hotel guests have the Trust lands available for
their enjoyment. For a trust to be charitable in nature it must be a nonprofit organization. In Mohonk the court reasoned that the adjacent resort and hotel owned by
the Smiley family afforded them only a peripheral benefit and did not defeat the
charitable nature of the trust. Id. at 485, 392 N.E.2d at 881, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 768. For
a recent description of the Mohonk area from a traveler's perspective, see Grimes, A
Resort ProgramBuilt Around Nature, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, § 10 (Travel) at 1,
col. 2.
53. Although the court states that prior to 1974 the Trust lands were listed as
exempt, id. at 481, 392 N.E.2d at 878, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 765, counsel for Mohonk explained that the land was taxed at a nominal rate until 1974. Interview with William
R. Ginsberg, Counsel to Petitioner-Appellant, Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors,
47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979) (Mar. 24, 1980).
54. Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, No. 77-75 (Sup. Ct., Ulster County,
Oct. 27, 1977), affd mem., 64 A.D.2d 789, 408 N.Y.S.2d 787 (3d Dep't 1978), rev'd,
47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979); Mohonk Trust v. Board of
Assessors, No. 75-162 (Sup. Ct., Ulster County, Aug. 6, 1976), aff'd mem., 64 A.D.2d
789, 408 N.Y.S.2d 787 (3d Dep't 1978), rev'd, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418
N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
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table" or "educational" purposes, as provided for in both article
1655 and section 421(1)(a), 5 6 or from its "moral or mental improve57
ment" purposes, as exempt only by the statute.
Mohonk was denied tax-exempt status in these two proceedings. Initially, in the Supreme Court, Ulster County, Justice
Pennock found that the land was used primarily for recreation and
conservation purposes. 58 Employing a strict construction of the
word "exclusively," 59 the court held that since recreation and conservation purposes were not listed specifically in section 421(1)(a),
they were not exempt.60 In a second proceeding in the same court,
Justice Casey held that a trust is not an organization or association
within the meaning of section 421, and thus land owned by a trust
could never be entitled to an exemption. 6 1 In a consolidated appeal
of the two decisions, the appellate division affirmed both judgments. 62 The dissenting opinion reasoned that Mohonk was an "association" and that the conservation and environmental purposes
were within the section 421(1)(a) exemption "upon the basis of the
Untermyer case."63
The Court of Appeals reversed, and in the opening paragraph
of its opinion stated the issue as whether the use of real property
55.

N.Y. CONST. art. 16,

§

1. For the text of this provision, see note 7 supra.

56. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421(1)(a) (McKinney 1972). For the text of this
provision, see note 8 supra.
57. Id. § 421(1)(b). For the text of this provision, see note 9 supra. Until recently, an organization was considered exempt only if an examination of the documents by which it was created showed that it was organized solely for an exempt
purpose, and it in fact pursued that purpose. Today, exemption is not dependent
upon the language of the document alone; "an organization may be entitled to an exemption if it is either 'organized or conducted' primarily for an exempt purpose or
purposes." 47 N.Y.2d at 484, 392 N.E.2d at 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (emphasis
in original).
58. Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, No. 75-162, slip op. at 6 (Sup. Ct., Ulster County, Aug. 6, 1976), aff'd mem., 64 A.D.2d 789, 408 N.Y.S.2d 787 (3d Dep't
1978), reo'd, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
59. But see Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 313 N.E.2d
30, 35, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555, 562 (1974); text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
60. Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, No. 75-162, slip op. at 6.
61. Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, No. 77-75 (Sup. Ct., Ulster County,
Oct 27, 1977), aff'd mem., 64 A.D.2d 789, 408 N.Y.S.2d 787 (3d Dep't 1978), rev'd,
47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979). The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's holding on this point. See 47 N.Y.2d at 483, 392 N.E.2d at
879, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 766. This Comment does not discuss whether a trust may be a
corporation or association within the meaning of § 421(1)(a), N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 421(1)(a) (McKinney 1972).
62. 64 A.D.2d 789, 408 N.Y.S.2d 787 (3d Dep't 1978) (mem.), rev'd, 47 N.Y.2d
476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
63. Id. at 790, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (Mikoll, J., dissenting).
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for environmental and conservation purposes as a wilderness area
open to the public constitutes a "charitable" use. The court concluded that such use was charitable and, thus, exempt. 64 Had the
court stopped there, conservation lands would have been afforded
constitutional protection from taxation.
Later in the opinion, after tracing the history of the Trust, its
organization, and its use of the land, the court reframes the issue
and asks whether the uses of the land are for religious, charitable,
hospital, moral or mental improvement, or cemetery purposes. The
reframed issue and the conclusion that follows more closely approximate the wording of section 421(1)(a). The court still finds the land
exempt but now reasons that Mohonk exhibits "an assortment of
'charitable . . . educational, [and] moral improvement of men,
women or children' purposes ..
-65 This second line of reasoning
may alter the nature of the exemption. To be insulated constitutionally the land must be used primarily for religious, educational,
or charitable purposes. 6 6 If the land is characterized as exhibiting
an "assortment" of uses, one of which is not constitutionally exempt, there may not be constitutional insulation.
Immediately following this alternate explanation for its holding, the court notes that
where the Legislature has chosen to create only limited exemptions for particular activities which might otherwise be deemed
to fall within the somewhat broader exemptions provided by sections 421[(1)(a)], those distinctions must be given full effect by
the courts ....
As it is, however, the Legislature has not seen
fit to remove environmental and conservation purposes from the
broad category of charitable, educational, or mental or moral improvement of man purposes within which they so neatly fit.
Hence, we conclude that such purposes are exempt .... 67
One could infer from this statement that the legislature may be
able to remove conservation lands to the discretionary exemption
category, 421(1)(b). This language, when read in conjunction with

64. 47 N.Y.2d at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 877, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
65. Id. at 484, 392 N.E.2d at 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 767 (citation omitted).
66. Although the constitution refers to "exclusive" use as entitling land to tax
exemption, N.Y. CONST art. 16, § 1, exclusive has been construed to mean principal
or primary in this context. See Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143,
153, 313 N.E.2d 30, 35, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561 (1974); text accompanying notes 14-15
supra.
67. 47 N.Y.2d at 484-85, 392 N.E.2d at 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 767-68 (citations
omitted).
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the court's second rationale, lends itself to the interpretation that
the exemption for conservation lands is not constitutionally insulated.
The Dichotomous Decision
Instead of resolving the issue of whether the conservation and
preservation of wilderness land for the public benefit is charitable
in nature and thus constitutionally protected, the court wrote a
confusing and contradictory opinion. The court gave two potentially
inconsistent rationales for its holding. First, it stated that the "use
of real property for environmental and conservation purposes as a
wilderness area open to the public constitutes a charitable use exempt under the statute." 6 8 Since the statutory provision exempting
charitable use is constitutionally mandated, 6 9 land use held to be
charitable under the statute would also be charitable under the
constitution, and conservation lands would be constitutionally immune from taxation. However, the court's later statement that the
land is exempt because it exhibits an "assortment" of charitable,
educational, and moral and mental improvement uses 70 is vague
and inconsistent with the first rationale. If the land is not used
primarily for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, but
rather for an "assortment" of uses, one of which-mental and moral
improvement-is not a constitutionally exempted use, then the
land is not constitutionally exempt. The court's recharacterization
of the Mohonk land is, therefore, of import. 7 1 In addition, there is

the undecipherable wording that follows the court's second line of
reasoning: "As it is, however, the Legislature has not seen fit to remove environmental and conservation purposes from the broad category of charitable, educational, or mental or moral improvement
of man purposes within which they so neatly fit." 7 2 This suggests
that the legislature has always been able to abrogate the exemption
68. Id. at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 877, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 764.

69. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1. See 47 N.Y.2d at 482, 392 N.E.2d at 879, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 766.
70. 47 N.Y.2d at 484, 392 N.E.2d at 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
71. One may only speculate why the court did not discuss the constitutional
issue. The court may have purposely avoided the issue, or the alternate lines of analyses may reflect a compromise made in an effort to reach a unanimous decision.
Counsel for Mohonk suggested that the language at the end of the opinion may evidence such a compromise. Interview with William R. Ginsberg, Counsel for
Petitioner-Appellant, Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392
N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979) (Nov. 10, 1979).
72. 47 N.Y.2d at 485, 392 N.E.2d at 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
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for conservation lands by placing such use in the discretionary exemption category of section 421(1)(b).
In deferring to the legislature, the court could mean either of
two things. First, that the legislature could have exercised its
power of definition and excluded conservation lands from the mandatory exemption category before the Mohonk decision, but now
that conservation lands have been defined by the court as charitable in nature the legislature no longer has this option. In this case,
conservation lands would be constitutionally protected. Second, the
court may have meant that the legislature could have excluded
conservation lands from mandatory exemption before the Mohonk
decision and can still do so even in light of that decision. The court
may have held the Mohonk lands exempt only because the legislature had not acted. In this case, there is no constitutional protection for conservation lands. As such, conservational use could be
removed to the discretionary exemption category of 421(1)(b) and
then would be exempt only at local option. This interpretation parallels the second line of reasoning, if by "assortment" the court
meant there was not primarily charitable or educational use.
Shortly after the Mohonk decision a similar issue was presented to the court of appeals in North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye. 73 This case involves the same wildlife sanctuary that previously was granted an exemption under the "mental
and moral improvement" provision. 74 The case was remanded to
determine whether the sanctuary was legitimately used for a
purpose that benefited the public. 75 However, the confusion surrounding the Mohonk decision seems to pervade this case in three
specific ways. First, the court adverts to its own holding in Mohonk
stating that it recently held that section 421 provides an "exemption for real property used as a wildlife sanctuary by a charitable
organization." 7 6 The Mohonk decision did not involve a wildlife
sanctuary, but involved the preservation of wilderness land. Second,
despite the court's use of the word "charitable," there is again no
mention of the constitutional implications of such a holding. Also,
the court's opinion does not mention that wildlife sanctuaries had
previously been held exempt under the "moral and mental improve73. 48 N.Y.2d 135, 397 N.E.2d 693, 422 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
74. See North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 52 Misc. 2d
96, 274 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 891, 282

N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1967).
75. 48 N.Y.2d at 141, 397 N.E.2d at 695-96, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
76. Id. at 139, 397 N.E.2d at 695, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
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ment" category. 77 Is the court using these terms interchangeably?
If so, since these terms have different legal consequences, this only
leads to more confusion concerning the nature of the exemptions in
these two cases. Third, as in Mohonk, at the end of the opinion the
court discusses the removal power of the legislature without saying
which land uses can be made subject to legislative abrogation. 78
Therefore, the nature of the exemptions granted in Mohonk and in
North Manursing are unclear.
The Court's Role
The issue before the court concerning the eligibility of conservation lands for exemption was narrowly framed by counsel in
Mohonk. 7 9 Because the statute offered a broader range of exemptions than the constitution, it was tactically wiser for counsel to argue for exemption under section 421(1)(a). s0 Although the court
was within its rights to deal only with the issue before it, and the
immediate practical result of a holding of exemption under the statute is the same as a holding of exemption under the constitution,
there are still several reasons why the court should have used a
constitutional analysis.
Initially, it must be recognized that the court's role is different
than the litigator's. The litigator presents the client's best case
while the court resolves the dispute before it. However, the court's
decision does affect more than the individuals currently in the
courtroom. Where there are important societal issues underlying
the private individual's claim, it is imperative for the court to address those broader issues and clarify the precedential implications
of its holding. 8 '
77. See North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 52 Misc. 2d
96, 274 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 891, 282
N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1967); Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Scopelliti, 66 Misc. 2d 611,
321 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
78. 48 N.Y.2d at 142, 397 N.E.2d at 697, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 5. See also Catskill
Center for Conservation & Dev., Inc. v. Voss, 63 A.D.2d 1091, 406 N.Y.S.2d 375 (3d
Dep't 1978).
79. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47
N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
80. Interview with William R. Ginsberg, Counsel for Petitioner-Appellant,
Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d
763 (1979) (Nov. 10, 1979).
81. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting). In Boomer the cement-making operations
of the defendant were found to constitute a nuisance. The threshold question raised
was "whether the court should resolve the litigation between the parties now before
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Second, because of the similarity in the language of the statute
and the constitution, and because a holding under the statute has
constitutional implications, the court should have dealt with the
constitutional issue. Whether conservation land is characterized as
primarily a charitable or educational use or primarily a mental or
moral improvement use determines whether exemption for conservation land is constitutionally insulated. Since the court in its initial
statement of the holding explicitly states that the use of the
Mohonk land was "charitable," it was incumbent on the court to
have at least specified and elaborated more clearly on the precise
scope of the exemption it granted.
Third, the court itself mentions article 16 of the constitution in
a footnote, explaining that parts of section 421(1)(a) implement and
are mandated by article 16.82 If the statute implements the constitution, some type of constitutional analysis would seem appropriate. Instead, the court reached the conclusion that the Trust land
was exempt entirely on statutory grounds.
When the court is dealing with the article 16 categories it is
important to remember that the New York Constitution states that
educational, charitable, and religious institutions "'as defined by
law" are exempt.8 3 The court has a role in defining the law and interpreting the constitution. It should not be left to the legislature
alone to define the terms religious, charitable, and educational. If
this had been the intention, article 16 would have been worded
differently. For example, article 3, section 22, of the New York
Constitution explicitly states that in any law imposing a tax measured by income, the legislature may define income. 8 4 Since article
16 reads "as defined by law," the court must play a part in giving
definition to the categories involved.
it as equitably as seems possible; or whether, seeking promotion of the general public welfare, it should channel private litigation into broader public objectives." Id. at

222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Although the majority granted only
damages, Justice Jasen's dissent argued that the court should have granted an injunction since the defendant's operation was also harmful to the public. See generally
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (importance of free press to society); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (necessary to ensure fair and impartial criminal process); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (broad effects
of-segregation on public education).
82. 47 N.Y.2d at 482 n.2, 392 N.E.2d at 879 n.2, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 766 n.2.
83. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1. For the text of this provision, see note 7
supra.
84. N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 22. See Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Misc. 2d 477, 478, 273
N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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The court could have helped to resolve this issue if it had offered some definitional distinction between "charitable" and "mental and moral improvement." Both of these terms are broad and
sound similar in purpose. However, as previously stated, there are
important legal distinctions. Only charitable use is protected
against legislative abrogation. When the court refers to the
Mohonk land as "charitable" and as exhibiting an "assortment" of
purposes-one of which is the "mental and moral improvement"
purpose-the distinction between these terms is further clouded.
There are two possible theories that could be advanced to provide a workable distinction between the "charitable" and the "mental
and moral improvement" categories. One distinction that has been
advanced is that mental and moral improvement pertains to use
that is limited to a more specific group.8 5 For example, lands held
by the YMCA, YWCA, the Boy Scouts, and the Girl Scouts have
been placed in this category. 8 6 This basis for distinction appears
precluded, however, by the existence of a few discordant decisions.
In the past, the court has held that wildlife sanctuaries8 7 and a social research organization8 8 fall in the mental and moral improvement category.
A second possible definition of mental and moral improvement
was provided by a lower court in a case where the YWCA was a
party. There the court stated: " 'We believe that organizations such
as the [YWCA] are distinguished by their combination of benevolent, religious and charitable aspects. It is this type of organization
to which the term "moral or mental improvement . . ." was meant
to apply' .... "89 Thus the court used this category when there
was a variety of uses, one of which, benevolent, is not entitled to
constitutional protection. In this situation the land does not qualify
85. - Ginsberg, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1.
86. See Young Womens Christian Ass'n v. Wagner, 96 Misc. 2d 361, 409
N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Opinion No. 17 (1975), 5 Opinions of Counsel, New
York State Board of Equalization and Assessment; Opinion No. 10 (1971), 1 Opinions
of Counsel, New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment.
87. North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 52 Misc. 2d 96,
274 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 28 A.D.2d 891, 282
N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1967); Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Scopelliti, 66 Misc. 2d 611,
321 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
88. Lower E. Side Action Project, Inc. v. Town of Liberty, 87 Misc. 2d 860, 387
N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (organization formed to investigate social problems of
youths held to be "mental and moral improvement" use).
89. Young Womens Christian Ass'n v. Wagner, 96 Misc. 2d 361, 365, 409
N.Y.S.2d 167, 170 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (emphasis added) (quoting Opinion No. 17 (1975),
5 Opinions of Counsel, New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol8/iss2/4

16

Miers: Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors
1980]

REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS

for constitutional insulation because no single use is primary and
the constitutionally protected uses, even when joined, do not constitute the primary use of the land. If it is this "combination of
uses" that sets this term apart from a purely charitable use, then
the second rationale-the assortment of uses explanation-that the
Mohonk court gives for its holding of exemption would not provide
constitutional protection for conservation land.
New York law is clear that a charitable organization must be
(1) nonprofit in nature, 90 (2) devoted to the welfare of the general
public, 9 1 and (3) organized or conducted "primarily" for a charitable purpose. 9 2 In the past, the court has attempted to define what
was primarily "religious" or "educational" use, and in Mohonk it
should have attempted to do the same for "charitable." For example, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Lewisohn 93 the issue
was whether the Jehovah's Witnesses were organized primarily for
bible purposes and therefore entitled to only a discretionary exemption under 421(1)(b), or primarily for religious purposes and
therefore entitled to a mandatory exemption under 421(1)(a). In
refining the definition of "religious," the court held that despite
the concurrent distribution of religious literature, the house-tohouse preaching was religious preaching and thus the society was
94
conducted primarily for religious purposes.
Similarly, in a case where the tax-exempt status of certain university property was challenged, the court has exercised its role in
defining what is "educational" use. 9 5 The court determined that although university courses dealt exclusively with race relations and
social problems and many students in those courses were not qualified for admission, this did not mean that the courses were not educational. In so holding, the court stated that its function was "to
examine the type and character of the use of the property" to de96
termine if the land was entitled to exemption.
90. E.g., Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d at 485, 392 N.E.2d at
881, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 768; N.Y. REAL PRop. TAX LAw § 421(1)(d) (McKinney 1972).
91. E.g., In re Will of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454,460, 112 N.E. 177, 178 (1916).
92. E.g., Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d at 482, 392 N.E.2d at
879, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
93. 35 N.Y.2d 92, 315 N.E.2d 801, 358 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1974).
94. Id. at 98, 315 N.E.2d at 804, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 760-61.
95. Application of Syracuse Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 684, 689, 300 N.Y.S.2d 129, 135
(Sup. Ct. 1969). See Swedenborg Foundation, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 87, 351

N.E.2d 702, 386 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1976) (defines education as development of faculties
and powers and the expansion of knowledge by teaching, instruction, or schooling).
96. In re Syracuse Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 684, 689, 300 N.Y.S.2d 129, 135 (Sup. Ct.
1969).
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The court has also exercised its role in removing institutions
from the three broad categories granted mandatory exemptions. In
Religious Society of Families v. Assessor of Carroll97 the court determined that an organization relying totally upon human reason
that denied the existence of a divine being was not a religious organization and thus not entitled to a tax exemption.9 8 Since in the
past the court has helped to define what is religious and educational use and has also removed specific types of organizations from
the three categories of exemptions allowed by the constitution, it
should not be left to the legislature alone to decide to remove conservation lands from the broad categories that offer mandatory exemptions.
Our perception of what constitutes a charitable use changes as
society changes, and charitable use should not be defined by rigid
legislative enactments. 99 Since the court is a more flexible decisionmaking body than the legislature, it is in the best position to
give definition to this word. If the court allows the legislature alone
to determine the nature of the exemption for conservation lands,
the court would be abdicating its role in defining the law and the
constitution.
ConstitutionalInsulationfor Conservation Land
Providing constitutional insulation for conservation land would
not have been a bold step nor a break with tradition. Not only is
there precedent for holding that conservation lands are charitable
in nature and thus constitutionally exempt, there is no precedent
for removing this type of use to the discretionary exemption category of 421(1)(b). People ex rel. Untermyer v. McGregor held that
parklike gounds dedicated to the public's use and enjoyment were
charitable in nature. 10 0 The dicta in In re Estate of De Forest suggests that the preservation of forest lands could also be considered
charitable. 10 1
Furthermore, since the purpose of tax exemption is to implement state policy,' 0 2 the court could have read article 16 along
97.

73 Misc. 2d 923, 343 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1973).

98. Id. at 927, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
99.

See G. BOGERT, supra note 39, § 369; Neuschwander & Moore, supra

note 39.
100. 295 N.Y. 237, 243, 66 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1946). See text accompanying notes
41 to 44 supra.
101. 147 Misc. 82, 85, 263 N.Y.S. 135, 139 (Sur. Ct. 1933). See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
102. See RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1109 (1938).
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with existing environmental and conservation policies of the state:
Article 14 of the constitution declares forest and wildlife conservation to be policies of the state and allows the legislature to appropriate money to acquire land for these purposes. 10 3 The court
could also have used the flexible rule of In re Estate of
Rockefeller-" 'a charitable use . . . may be applied to almost any
thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of
social man' "10 4-- and held that conservation lands are charitable in
nature and should be constitutionally protected as long as they are
held by a nonprofit organization for the public benefit.
If, on the other hand, the court did not want to provide constitutional immunization for conservation land, the differences and
similarities of the wording of section 421(1)(a) and article 16 of the
constitution should have been analyzed, and the court could have
held Mohonk exempt under only the moral and mental improvement clause of the statute.' 0 5 As a result, conservation lands would
be held exempt as long as the courts continue to reason that they
fall under this clause, or until the legislature passes a law excluding
them from exemption. This analysis has merit because it addresses
the constitutional issue and provides the clarity and consistency
lacking in the Mohonk decision.
CONCLUSION

In the landmark Mohonk case the New York Court of Appeals
held that conservation land qualifies under New York law for taxexempt status. As this decision recognizes the benefits gained by
protecting the natural beauty of our environment, its results must
be heralded. If the court had not held the Mohonk land exempt, it
is likely that in the upcoming years we would see many acres of
unspoiled land owned by private individuals sold for development.
However, because of the inconsistent language within the opinion,
the nature of the exemption is unclear. This ambiguity is lamentable because it has the potential to undermine the result. The language in the decision concerning the legislature's power to remove
may inadvertently prompt unconstitutional legislative action and is,
103. N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 3(1). For a partial text of this provision, see note 1
supra.
104. 177 A.D. 786, 791, 165 N.Y.S. 154, 157-58 (1st Dep't 1917).
105. See North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. v. City of Rye, 52 Misc. 2d
96, 274 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (land used as bird and wildlife sanctuary exempt only by statute; held to fall under "moral or mental imporvement" category),
rev'd on other grounds, 28 A.D. 891, 282 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1967).
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at the least, anomalous in an opinion that initially reasoned that the
use involved was primarily charitable in nature.
The analysis suggested by this Comment would have added
clarity to the opinion and would have determined whether conservation lands are constitutionally exempt and thus safeguarded
against future adverse legislation. Since this question was not answered, Mohonk may be a hollow victory for environmentalists.
Gail Miers
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